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COMMENT
THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION IN FLORIDA
W. CORT FROHLICH* and DONALD L. GIBSON**
This article examines the recently enacted Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act in Florida. After briefly discussing the
common law doctrine of no contribution and efforts to alleviate
such a harsh rule, the authors focus on the serious conflicts be-
tween the new statute and the underlying equitable principles of
Hoffman v. Jones. In particular, the pro rata sharing of liability,
the settlement, and the release provisions of the statute are criti-
cized as not allocating the ultimate liability of the tortfeasors
based on their relative degrees of fault. The authors suggest that
a legislative change regarding these provisions is warranted so as
to maintain a consistent and equitable apportionment system for
everyone.
I. IN TRO DUCTIO N ............................. ....... ........ ........... 7 13
I. CONTRIBUTION: THE COMMON LAW RULE ABOLISHED ........................ 715
III. THE UNIFORM ACTS AND CONTRIBUTION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS ............... 720
IV. THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION IN FLORIDA ..................... 725
V. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS: SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE PROVISIONS OF THE CON-
TRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT .................................... 728
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY ............................. 731
V II. C ONCLUSION .......................................................... 736
I. INTRODUCTION
The Florida Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act' creates a
basic right of contribution2 among tortfeasors, and signals the de-
mise of the "common law" rule in Florida prohibiting contribution
between joint wrongdoers.' The new legislation, modeled after the
* Managing Editor, University of Florida Law Review.
** Member, University of Florida Law Review.
1. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
2. Contribution is the right of one defendant, who has discharged a common liability,
to recover from another joint defendant his share of the common liability. See generally,
Comment, South Dakota Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act: A Problem of
Interpretation? 16 S.D.L. REV. 447 (1971).
3. See notes 14-17 infra and accompanying text.
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1955 draft of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act'
promulgated by the Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, seeks to achieve equity and justice through a pro ratal sharing
of common fiscal responsibility by those joint tortfeasors who have
paid more than their pro rata share of the common liability.' Al-
though designed to provide the uniformity in contribution that was
lacking under an earlier Uniform Act drafted in 1939,1 the new law
raises serious problems of interpretation and application in Florida.
The primary issue, and the focus of this article, is the conflict
between the principles of comparative negligence and equity
adopted by the Supreme Court of Florida in Hoffman v. Jones,' and
the pro rata principle of contribution contained in the Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act.9 In Hoffman, the court declared that "[in
the field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be
reached by a court is the equation of liability with fault."' 0 The
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act expressly states, however, that
the degrees of fault will not be considered in determining the pro
4. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, (1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 63 (1975).
5. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1975). See note 9 infra.
6. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1975).
7. The Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1939 was adopted in the follow-
ing jurisdictions: Arkansas, ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 34-1001 to 34-1009 (1975); Delaware, 10 DEL.
CODE ANN. §§ 6301 to 6308 (1975); Hawaii, HAWAII REV. STAT. §§ 663-11 to 663-17 (1975);
Maryland, MD. ANN. CONE, art. 50, §§ 16-24 (1975); Mississippi, MISS. CODE ANN. § 85-5-5
(1975); New Jersey, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:53A-1 to 2A:53A-5 (1975); New Mexico, N.M. STAT.
ANN. §§ 24-1-11 to 24-1-18 (1975); Pennsylvania, PA. STAT. §§ 2081 to 2089 (1975); Rhode
Island, R. 1. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 10-6-1 to 10-6-11 (1975); South Dakota, S.D. CoMP. LAWS
ANN. §§ 15-8-11 to 15-8-22 (1975).
Most of these states made substantial modifications in the 1939 Act which defeated the
basic idea of uniformity. Because of unfavorable reports as to the progress and operation of
the 1939 Act, the Commissioners withdrew it for further study and revision. The 1955 Act
was promulgated in the hope that it would reconcile the serious variations which existed
and eliminate the mounting confusion. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT,
Commissioners' Prefatory Note (1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 59-60 (1975).
8. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
9. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1975):
Pro Rata Shares. - In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors in the entire
liability:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall not be considered.
(b) If equity requires, the collective liability of some as a group shall
constitute a single share.
(c) Principles of equity applicable to contribution generally shall
apply.
10. 280 So. 2d at 438.
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rata liability of joint tortfeasors." Instead, a pro rata share will
generally be determined by dividing the number of joint tortfeasors
into the amount of the judgment." For example, in the normal
situation, if two joint tortfeasors are found liable for a judgment of
$100,000, each of their pro rata shares would be $50,000, regardless
of their respective degrees of negligence in creating the accident. In
a situation where damages are $100,000 and Defendant A is only 20
percent negligent while Defendant B is 80 percent negligent, Defen-
dant A will be held accountable for 30 percent of the damages for
which he is not responsible. If one accepts the Hoffman premise that
liability should be equated with fault, such a result is clearly incon-
sistent with that premise and therefore is unjust.
However, before examining in detail the possible conflict of the
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act with the principles espoused
in Hoffman, an examination of how the Act changes the common
law, and an examination of how other states have dealt with the
possible conflict between comparative negligence principles and the
pro rata provisions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act is
warranted.
II. CONTRIBUTION: THE COMMON LAw RULE ABOLISHED
The fundamental provision of the Contribution Among Tortfea-
sors Act is contained in Florida Statutes § 761.31(2)(a) which estab-
lishes a basic right to contribution when two or more persons be-
come jointly and severally liable in tort for a single personal injury,
wrongful death, or property damage." Prior to the passage of Contri-
11. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3) (a) (1975). Note that the right to contribution arises only after
one of the joint tortfeasors has paid more than his pro rata share of the common liability.
FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1975).
12. The general determination of pro rata shares is tempered somewhat by FLA. STAT.
§§ 768.31(3)(b) and (c) (1975). See note 9 supra.
Examples of equity considerations modifying a pro rata division are: (1) vicarious rela-
tionships, such as master-servant, where the wrong of the servant should in fairness be treated
as a single share; (2) situations involving co-owners of property; (3) instances where members
of an unincorporated association are involved, etc.
Another example of how equity generally will apply involves the situation where there
are at least three defendant-tortfeasors, one of whom is insolvent. In those instances it is
suggested that a defendant-tortfeasor who has paid the plaintiff the full judgment should still
only receive contribution of one-third from the other solvent tortfeasor, as opposed to one-
half. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2, Commissioners' Comment
(1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 87-88 (1975).
13. The new legislation does not affect the doctrine of joint and several liability as
developed in Florida. Contribution shifts liability only after the injured party has received
1976]
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bution Among Tortfeasors Act, there could be no contribution be-
tween tortfeasors in Florida. 4 Apparently misconstruing the English
case of Merryweather v. Nixan,5 the courts of Florida, as well as
those of most American jurisdictions, enforced a general "common
law" rule against contribution.' 6 Claiming to adopt the
Merryweather view, the judiciary in Florida seems to have failed to
comprehend the limitations implicit in its facts, and continually
treated the case as the general rule prohibiting contribution, rather
than for the exception for which it stood. 7 Furthermore, Florida
expanded the common law definition of joint tort," i.e. wrongs per-
petrated by two or more persons acting in concert, to encompass
compensation for the loss occasioned by the defendants' negligent conduct. All joint tortfea-
sors will continue to be jointly and severally liable to the plaintiff for the injury as if they
had acted alone in causing the damage.
For a discussion of whether the Hoffman principles of equating liability with fault indi-
cate that joint and several liability should be abrogated see Timmons & Silvis, Pure Compar-
ative Negligence in Florida: A New Adventure in the Common Law, 28 U. MIAMI L. REV. 737,
780-787 (1974). See also 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 747 (1976).
14. H.E. Wolfe Constr. Co. v. Ellison, 127 Fla. 808, 174 So. 594 (1937); Seaboard Air Line
Ry. v. American Dist. Elect. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143 So. 316 (1932); Feinstone v.
Allison Hosp., Inc., 106 Fla. 302, 143 So. 251 (1932); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 67 Fla.
257, 65 So. 8 (1914); Rader v. Variety Children's Hosp., 293 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974);
Stembler v. Smith, 242 So. 2d 472 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1970); Kellenberger v. Widener, 159 So. 2d
267 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963); Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellows, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963).
15. 8 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep. 1337 (K.B. 1799).
16. See cases cited in note 14 supra. See also Union Stock Yards Co. v. Chicago, B. &
Q.R.R., 196 U.S. 217 (1905); Denneler v. Aubel Ditching Service, Inc. 203 Kan. 117, 453 P.2d
88, (1969); Riexinger v. Ashton Co., 9 Ariz. App. 406, 453 P.2d 235 (1969); National Trailer
Convoy, Inc. v. Oklahoma Turnpike Auth., 434 P.2d 238 (Okla. 1967); Fidelity & Cas. Co. of
New York v. Chapman, 167 Or. 661, 120 P.2d 223 (1941); Adams v. White Bus Line, 184 Cal.
710, 195 P. 389 (1921).
17. In Merryweather:
"Lord Kenyon, Ch. J. said, there could be no doubt but that the nonsuit was
proper: that he had never before heard of such an action having been brought,
where the former recovery was for a tort: that the distinction was clear between
this case and that of a joint judgment against several defendants in an action of
assumpsit .... "
Although Merryweather states that the action is unheard of where a tort is involved, the
concept of tort was strictly limited at that point in the common law to conscious, wilful,
malicious, or intentional wrongs. "At that time the word 'tort' had not come to be applied to
the vast number of quasi delicts not known and classified as actions sounding in tort and
arising out of mere negligence or unintentional injury." Reath, Contribution Between Persons
Jointly Charged for Negligence-Merryweather v. Nixan, 12 HARV. L. REV. 176, 178 (1898).
Therefore, Merryweather actually stands for the exception to the general rule that a court
will imply an assumpsit for indemnity or contribution among persons jointly liable. Id. at 177.
18. For a discussion of the history and theories of joint and several liability see Jackson,
Joint Torts and Several Liability, 17 TEX. L. REV. 399 (1939) and Prosser, Joint Torts and
Several Liability, 25 CAL. L. REV. 413 (1937).
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independent, concurring torts by parties having no prior relation-
ship to each other. 9
The combined effect of the no contribution rule and the expan-
sion of the term "joint tort" gave to the victim of the tortious con-
duct the absolute power to determine the subject of liability.' The
19. See De La Concha v. Pinero, 104 So. 2d 25 (Fla. 1958); Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So.
2d 865 (Fla. 1952); Hemandez v. Pensacola Coach Corp., 141 Fla. 441, 193 So. 555 (1940);
Feinstone v. Allison Hosp., Inc., 106 Fla. 302, 143 So. 251 (1932); Starling v. City of Gaines-
ville, 90 Fla. 613, 106 So. 425 (1925); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So. 8 (1914).
The 1939 Uniform Act defined the term "joint tortfeasors" to mean two or more persons
jointly or severally liable in tort for the same injury to person or property, whether or not a
judgment had been recovered against all or some of them.
The phrase "whether or not judgment has been recovered against all or some of them"
was included to indicate that an express finding of joint and several liability was not a
necessary prerequisite to the recovery of contribution among tortfeasors. If the injured person
P was hurt by the concurrent negligence of A and B and recovered a judgment in a suit only
against A, contribution could be recovered by A against B in a separate action. UNIFORM
CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 1, Commissioners' Notes (1939), 9 UNIFORM LAWS
ANN. 233 (1957).
The 1955 Uniform Act eliminated the definition of "joint tortfeasors" found in the 1939
version to avoid problems of interpretation in jurisdictions in which those who acted indepen-
dently and not in concert could not be joined as defendants in the same action.
Commissioners' Notes (1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 64 (1975). Florida's adherence
to the principle, that where the negligence of two or more persons concurs in producing a
single indivisible injury, joint and several liability exists even though there was no common
duty, design, nor concerted action, gives FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(a) virtually the same meaning
provided for under the 1939 Uniform Act.
20. Comment, The Allocation of Loss Among Joing Tortfeasors, 41 S. CAL. L. REV. 728,
732 (1968). See generally Comment, South Dakota Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act: A Problem of Interpretation?, 16 S.D. L. REV. 477 (1971); Comment, Contribution
Among Joint Tortfeasors, 44 TEX. L. REv. 326 (1965).
Despite the injustice of allowing the plaintiff to select arbitrarily the subject of liability,
several reasons were advanced by the courts for preventing contribution among joint tortfea-
sors. The principal philosophical reason against allowing contribution was that no man
should he able to make his misconduct the ground for an action in his favor-in pari delicto
portior est conditio defendantis. Merryweather v. Nixan, 80 Term Rep. 186, 101 Eng. Rep.
1337 (K.B. 1799); Adamson v. Jarvis, 4 Bing. 66 (1827). Denial of access to the courts was
thought to punish past misconduct and to discourage similar prospective improper activity.
Jones, Contribution Among Tortfeasors, 11 U. FLA. L. REV. 175, 180 (1958). Such a rule was
perceived to prevent prospective tortfeasors from participation with others in acts for fear of
being compelled to pay the entire damages instead of only a ratable share of them. Lelfar,
Contribution and Indemnity Between Tortfeasors, 81 U. PA. L. REv., 130, 133 (1932).
One legal scholar argued that contribution would make it more difficult for the claimant
to settle cases involving multiple tortfeasors. James, Contribution Among Joint Tortfeasors:
A Pragmatic Criticism, 54 HARV. L. REV. 1156, 1160 (1941). Despite agreeing to settle with
the plaintiff, a tortfeasor could still be called upon to pay his share of any verdict which was
rendered against his fellow joint tortfeasors, and therefore, would not want to settle until they
all did. Id. at 1161. (This, however, is not true under the new Florida Statute. See § 768.31(5)
(1975), which provides for the discharge of liability for contribution for a settling party given
a release.)
19761
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plaintiff was permitted to place the entire burden of responsibility
for payment on one defendant, who was then helpless to shift any
of the responsibility to the other joint defendants. The injured party
could sue any joint tortfeasor individually and collect the entire
amount of damages, or he could join defendants and then collect
from any one or all of those held liable for the full amount of the
damages. The parties not sued or not attached escaped without
paying any of the damages.
To remedy the harsh effects of denying contribution, Florida
courts circumvented the rule by applying principles of idemnifi-
cation. In doing so the courts demonstrated an amazing dexterity
in manipulating the doctrine of indemnity to allow some compen-
sation between tortfeasors.' When a separate and distinct duty
between tortfeasors existed and the violation of such duty result-
ed in injury to the plaintiff, indemnity was employed to permit
compensation to the non-breaching tortfeasor.22 In a case where
two joint tortfeasors were at fault and both liable to the party in-
jured, yet not in pari delicto as to each other, and the act of only
one tortfeasor was the primary cause of the injury, the secondary
In addition, allowing contribution could have favored the powerful and wealthy at the
expense of the poor and weak during negotiation, thus bringing about a less satisfactory social
distribution of accident losses than existed. James, supra at 1165. Finally, contribution may
have been undesirable because of perceived administrative difficulty in apportioning fault
between tortfeasors. However, in light of today's juries having little trouble allocating relative
degrees- of fault between a plaintiff and defendant in comparative negligence cases, such
apprehension seems unwarranted. See text accompanying note 91 infra.
21. See, e.g., Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330,
143 So. 316 (1932) (failure of a railroad signal which co-defendant signal company had a duty
to maintain caused plaintiff's injury, and defendant railroad company was allowed indemnifi-
cation where there was a violation of a duty owed by one defendant to another); Stuart v.
Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974) (negligent defendant allowed indemnifica-
tion from doctor for aggravation of an injury); Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. J.C. Penney Co.,
166 So. 2d 211 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1964) (store owner allowed indemnification from installer of an
escalator who had given assurances of "smooth and quiet operation," which breach was found
to be the proximate cause of the injury). See generally Stuart v. Hertz Corp., supra for other
examples.
Indemnity differs from contribution in that indemnity, in its purest sense, is founded
upon contract, express or implied, whereas contribution is derived, not from any contractual
obligation, but rather from principles of equity. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., supra at 190. In
addition, indemnity transfers the entire loss from one tortfeasor, who has been compelled to
pay it, onto the shoulders of another tortfeasor who should pay it, while contribution can be
employed to shift a partial amount of liability, based on either a pro rata or percentage of
fault determination. Id.
22. See Seaboard Air Line Ry. v. American Dist. Elec. Protective Co., 106 Fla. 330, 143
So. 316 (1932).
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tortfeasor was allowed to seek indemnity." If the active negligence
of one tortfeasor and the passive negligence of another were com-
bined to proximately cause one injury to a third person, the pas-
sively negligent tortfeasor, who would be compelled to pay damages
to the injured party, could be entitled to indemnity from the ac-
tively negligent tortfeasor.24
Under the guise of "equitable indemnity," one Florida court
actually allowed partial indemnification (in reality contribution)
where injuries incurred in one automobile accident were aggravated
by a physician's negligence.2" Affirming the trial court's denial of a
motion to dismiss the third party complaint, the court declared that
the car rental agency was liable to the plaintiff for the full amount
of damages, but it could recover from the doctor for any aggravation
of the injury. "
The new Florida Act, by conclusively establishing a right of
contribution, enables the courts to avoid the theoretical confusion
in the field of negligence created by the cavalier expansion of the
concept of "indemnity" to encomass true contribution situations.
While not preventing further distortion of the doctrine of indemnity,
the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act does alleviate the necessity
for further distortion by abrogating the no contribution rule. The
present distortions may remain, however, since the Act does not
impair any right of indemnity under existing law.27 What is certain
is that there should be no right of contribution in indemnity situa-
tions, unless it is recovered from a third tortfeasor against whom no
right of indemnity exists.2"
The right of contribution established by the Act exists only in
23. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). For a detailed discussion
of the active-passive negligence doctrine see Hunsucker v. High Point Bending & Chair Co.,
75 S.E.2d 768 (N.C. 1953); Dole v. Dow Chemical, 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.
2d 382 (1972).
24. See Winn-Dixie Stores, Inc. v. Fellow, 153 So. 2d 45 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1963). It is
interesting to note that the court in Winn-Dixie acknowledged the fact that no contract of
indemnification existed between the active and passive tortfeasors. The duty imposed by law
upon the actively negligent tortfeasor to reimburse the passively negligent tortfeasor would
have rested upon an implied contract arising from the fact the latter had merely discharged
an obligation for which the former was primarily liable. Id. at 50. See also note 21 supra.
25. Stuart v. Hertz Corp., 302 So. 2d 187 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974). See discussion note 21
supra.
26. Id.
27. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(f) (1975).
28. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, Commissioners' Comments
(1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 66 (1975).
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favor of a tortfeasor who has paid more than his pro rata share of
the common liability.29 The total recovery is thus limited to the
amount paid by any tortfeasor in excess of his pro rata share, and
under the new Act, no tortfeasor can be compelled to pay contribu-
tion beyond his own pro rata share of liability. 0
III. THE UNIFORM ACTS AND CONTRIBUTION IN OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The 1939 Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act drafted
by the Commissioners on Uniform Laws contained an optional pro-
vision which allowed consideration of the relative degrees of fault of
the joint tortfeasors in determining their pro rata shares.3 This
optional section provided that when there was such dispropor-
tionate fault among joint tortfeasors as to make an equal distribu-
tion by contribution among the tortfeasors of common liability ine-
quitable, the relative degrees of fault were to be examined to deter-
mine the proper shares.32
Although the Commissioners may have believed that the ap-
portionment of the relative degrees of fault among joint tortfeasors
was a sound and equitable position,33 apprehension existed that
some states would be unwilling to extend the right of contribution
to that extreme.34 Rather than jeopardize the passage of the entire
act, the commissioners made the relative degree of fault provision
optional."
Also, the 1939 optional provision providing for apportionment
based on the relative degrees of fault among joint tortfeasors was
qualified by another subsection which provided that the apportion-
ment provision applied only if the issue of proportionate fault was
litigated between the joint tortfeasors by cross-complaint.36 The
purpose of this restriction was to compel litigation of the issue of
29. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1975).
30. Id.
31. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2 (4) (1939), 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
235 (1957).
32. Id.
33. Commissioners' Note (1939 Act), 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 236-37 (1957).
34. Comment, South Dakota Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act: A Problem
of Interpretation? 16 S.D. L. REV. 447, 449 (1971).
35. Only four states adopted the optional apportionment provision-Arkansas, Dela-
ware, Hawaii, and South Dakota. See note 7 supra.
36. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 7(5) (1939), 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN.
247 (1957).
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apportionment during the trial of the issue of culpability, thus
avoiding the multiplicity of rehearing the same testimony and evi-
dence at a later time.37 However, the Florida Act and the 1955 Uni-
form Act on which it was based contain no provision creating a
relative degree of fault rule. Rather, they provide that contribution
will be based on a pro rata division of the common liability irrespec-
tive of the degrees of fault among the joint tortfeasors.35
Seven states have enacted the 1955 Uniform Act in some form. 39
Of the seven, Florida, Massachusetts, Nevada, and North Dakota
have also adopted the doctrine of comparative negligence. 0 There-
fore, it would be helpful to examine some of these states' statutes
and their judicial interpretations in order to discover the various
applications of comparative negligence principles to the doctrine of
contribution among tortfeasors.
A few courts have chosen to apply the pro rata provision liter-
ally and without modification.4 The possible conflict with compara-
tive negligence provisions has apparently been avoided by the courts
of the states in question. The Supreme Court of North Dakota
stated simply that when the actions of the defendants are the proxi-
mate cause of an injury the court will not determine their relative
degrees of fault and they will share equally in the damages.2
In Massachusetts if two or more tortfeasors injure a plaintiff in
the same accident, each tortfeasor, if his negligence is greater than
the plaintiff's, is liable for all of the plaintiffs damages, diminished
in proportion to the amount of negligence attributable to the plain-
tiff.43 The only consideration of fault in such a system is the initial
37. See Commissioners' Notes (1939 Act), 9 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 249 (1957). Failure to
raise the issue of apportionment during trial required the joint tortfeasors to abide by the ratio
of equal pro rata shares.
38. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975). See note 9 supra.
39. In addition to Florida they are: Alaska, ALASKA STAT. §§ 09.16.010 to .060 (1973);
Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 231B, §§ 1-4 (Supp. 1975); Nevada, NEV. REv.
STAT. §§ 17.215 - .325 (1973); North Carolina, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1B-1 to -6 (1969), as
amended, (Cum. Supp. 1975); North Dakota, N.D. CENT. Code §§ 32-38-01 to -04 (1960); and
Tennessee, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 23-3101 to -3106 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
40. Massachusetts, MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch 231, § 85 (Supp. 1975); Nevada, NEv. REv.
STAT. § 41.141 (1973); North Dakota, N.D. CENT CODE § 9-10-07 (Supp. 1973). Florida judi-
cially adopted comparative negligence in Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
41. See, e.g., Steuber v. Hastings Heating & Sheet Metal Co., 153 N.W.2d 804 (N.D.
1967).
42. Id.
43. Massachusetts, unlike Florida, does not employ pure comparative negligence. In
Massachusetts contributory negligence is not a bar to recovery provided the plaintiff's negli-
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jury determination as to whether the particular tortfeasor was in
any way responsible. Once that is determined, all consideration of
fault abruptly ceases and apportionment in contribution actions is
strictly pro rata.4 A plaintiff may arbitrarily elect to sue and/or
collect from either party in order to receive a full recovery.45 If the
defendant is assessed more than his pro rata share of the liability,
he may seek contribution from the other tortfeasor.5 For example,
assume a three party accident with damages to A of $100,000 and
negligence in the following percentages: A-10 percent; B-20 per-
cent; and C-70 percent. If A sues only C or seeks satisfaction of the
judgment from only C, even if B was joined, he will recover $90,000,
which represents the entire $100,000 judgment reduced by the 10
percent liability of A. 7 If C then sought contribution from B, C
could recover $45,000, representing one half4" of the $90,000 paid to
A. In other words despite the fact that C's negligence was far greater
than B's, each is ultimately held equally liable. Conversely, if A
collected the $90,000 from B only, B could only recover $45,000 from
C in contribution. Therefore B again ultimately pays $25,000 for
which he is not responsible. The inequities of such a contribution
rule are evident.
Wisconsin, long a forerunner in negligence law, has judicially
recognized contribution among joint tortfeasors 45 and has legisla-
tively embraced the doctrine of comparative negligence.. Because
the Supreme Court of Wisconsin had to consider to what extent the
gence is "not as great as" that of the defendant(s). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85 (Supp.
1975).
44. Regarding contribution, the responsibility of the jury is simply to determine how
many persons were at fault, no matter how minute their negligence may have been in causing
the accident. Once the total amount of damages has been calculated, the liability of each
tortfeasor will usually be determined by dividing the number of tortfeasors into the amount
of the judgment. The size of the pro rata share depends entirely on how many tortfeasors
caused the injury, regardless of their respective degrees of fault. See note 12 supra and
accompanying text.
45. See Bouchard, Apportionment of Damages Under Comparative Negligence, 55 MASS.
L.Q. 125, 133 (1970).
46. Id. at 134.
47. This is the same position taken by the Supreme Court of Florida in Hoffman v. Jones,
280 So. 2d 431 (1973). Florida employs "pure" comparative negligence. Therefore, a plaintiff
may recover damages even if he is more negligent than defendant. This is not true in Massa-
chusetts. See note 43 supra.
48. If there had been three joint tortfeasors each accordingly would be held accountable
for one third of the total amount of damages paid.
49. See Bielski v. Schulze, 16 Wisc. 2d 1, 114 N.W. 2d 105 (1962).
50. WISC. STAT. ANN. § 895.045 (1966), as amended (Supp. 1975).
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principles of comparative negligence apply in defining the right of
contribution among tortfeasors, the Wisconsin court's analysis will
be helpful in determining how the two doctrines can be most accur-
ately reconciled.
Wisconsin judicially recognized the doctrine of contribution in
Ellis v. Chicago & Northwestern Railway5' in 1918. From 1918 until
1962 the Wisconsin courts apportioned liability on a strict pro rata
basis with no consideration of relative degrees of fault. However, in
1962, in the landmark case of Bielski v. Schulze,52 Wisconsin's high-
est court propounded what has become known as the doctrine of
"comparative contribution."53 Rather than basing the recovery in an
action for contribution upon pro rata shares as in Massachusetts
and North Dakota, the Wisconsin court in Bielski awarded recovery
on the percentage of each tortfeasor's fault. 4 Applying the prior
example, in Wisconsin, both B and C would be individually liable
for all the damages,55 however, if A had recovered the full $90,000
from B, B, who was responsible for only 20 percent of A's damages
could recoup $70,000 from C. Similarly, if A had elected to sue C
only, or to collect the entire judgment from him, C would only be
entitled to $20,000 from B.
In choosing to apply comparative negligence principles to con-
tribution among joint tortfeasors rather than continuing the prac-
tice of apportioning damages on a pro rata basis, the Supreme Court
of Wisconsin in Bielski stated that:
If the doctrine [contribution] is to do equity, there is no reason
in logic or in natural justice why the shares of common liability
of joint tortfeasors should not be translated into the percentage
of the causal negligence which contributed to the injury . . .. It
is difficult to justify, either on a layman's sense of justice or on
natural justice, why a joint tortfeasor who is 5% causally negli-
gent should only recover 50% of the amount he paid to the plain-
tiff from a co-tortfeasor who is 95% causally negligent, and con-
versely why the defendant who is found 5% causally negligent
51. 167 Wisc. 392, 167 N.W. 1048 (1918).
52. 16 Wisc. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962).
53. See Bouchard, supra note 45 at 133.
54. 16 Wisc. 2d at 6, 114 N.W.2d at 107. See also Johnson v. Heintz, 61 Wisc. 2d 585,
213 N.W.2d 85 (1973); City of Franklin v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wisc. 2d 641,
207 N.W.2d 866 (1973).
55. Bielski specifically recognizes the continued viability of joint and several liability.
16 Wisc. 2d at 6, 114 N.W.2d at 107.
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should be required to pay 50% of the loss by way of the reimburse-
ment to the co-tortfeasor who is 95% negligent.'
Thus, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin established "compara-
tive contribution" as the law of that state, thereby endorsing the
belief that the same equitable considerations which mandate contri-
bution as a desirable and just doctrine also mandate that the mone-
tary amount of contribution assessed to a particular tortfeasor be
dependent on the percentage of injury caused by his negligence. 7
Since Bielski, Wisconsin courts have consistently demanded that
contribution among joint tortfeasors be based upon principles of
comparative negligence. 8
New York, even before adopting comparative negligence by
statute," recognized the principle allowing a defendant to apportion
liability for negligence with a third party who was responsible for
part of the negligence. In Dole v. Dow Chemical Co.,'" an adminis-
tratrix of the estate brought a wrongful death action against a chem-
ical company which had sprayed the deceased's employer's grain
bin with a volatile and possibly poisonous substance. The defendant
chemical company was held to have the right to prove the de-
ceased's employer's responsibility and seek an apportionment of the
56. 16 Wisc. 2d at 9, 114 N.W.2d at 109.
57. Florida considered adopting the Wisconsin Plan in 1975. The original legislation
introduced was divided into two sections-one addressing comparative negligence and the
other contribution among tortfeasors. The latter part of the bill was patterned specifically
after the plan adopted by Wisconsin for apportioning loss among tortfeasors. Under the
Wisconsin Plan, as modified, there would have been contribution between joint tortfeasors
proportionate to the negligence attributable to each. Damages allowed would have been
diminished in proportion to the negligence of the person seeking contribution. No recovery
would have been allowed if the negligence of the person against whom recovery was sought
was less than that of the person seeking contribution. This legislation, the original Senate
Bill 98, was rejected in committee.
A second bill, Senate Bill 206, was introduced on the issue of comparative negligence.
Although this bill merely embodied the basic principles of Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431
(Fla. 1973), it died in a subsequent committee.
Following the defeat of the original Senate Bill 98, the Judiciary Committee requested
representatives of transportation interests, insurance interests, and the Academy of Florida
Trial Lawyers to meet and arrive at a compromise measure. The present Contribution Among
Tortfeasors Act was the result of their efforts.
58. See, e.g., Johnson v. Heintz, 61 Wisc. 2d 585, 213 N.W.2d 85 (1973); City of Franklin
v. Badger Ford Truck Sales, Inc., 58 Wisc. 2d 641, 207 N.W.2d 866 (1973); Valiga v. National
Food Co., 58 Wisc. 2d 232, 206 N.W.2d 377 (1973).
59. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1411 (McKinney Supp. 1975-76) became effective September 1,
1975.
60. 30 N.Y.2d 143, 282 N.E.2d 288, 331 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1972).
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damages. The court rejected the active-passive basis of apportion-
ing liability in favor of the concept of partial indemnification. The
court stated:
[The] [r]ight to apportionment of liability or to full indemnity,
then, as among parties involved together in causing damage by
negligence, should rest on relative responsibility and [is] to be
determined on the facts."
It is interesting to note that New York and Wisconsin, in judi-
cially adopting contribution principles, found that in apportioning
damages equitably, the relative degrees of fault of the parties must
be considered. This is in direct contrast with those states adopting
the 1955 draft of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act,"2 but consistent with the states adopting the optional provisions
of the 1939 draft of the Uniform Act."
IV. THE CASE FOR COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION IN FLORIDA
In 1973, in the landmark case of Hoffman v. Jones,"4 the Su-
preme Court of Florida adopted comparative negligence as the law
of the state in negligence actions. Stating that common law precepts
of contributory negligence could, and should, be overturned in light
of current "social and economic customs"" and modern "concep-
tions of right and justice"" the court went on to say that "[i]n the
field of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached
by a court is the equation of liability with fault."" Moreover, the
supreme court espoused its belief that "[i]f fault is to remain the
test of liability, then the doctrine of comparative negligence which
involves apportionment of the loss among those whose fault contrib-
uted to the occurrence is more consistent with liability based on a
fault premise."" The court also stated its conviction that "[w]hen
the negligence of more than one person contributes to the occurrence
of an accident, each should pay the proportion of the total damages
he has caused to the other party.""
61. 30 N.Y.2d at 153, 282 N.E.2d at 295, 331 N.Y.S.2d at 391-92.
62. See note 39 supra.
63. See notes 7 and 35 supra.
64. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
65. Id. at 436.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 438.
68. Id. at 436.
69. Id. at 437 (emphasis added).
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Therefore, if the supreme court applied the equitable principles
of Hoffman to the common law rule prohibiting contribution among
tortfeasors,70 one would expect that, at the very least, the court
would follow the Bielski v. Schultz7 analysis. In Bielski, as dis-
cussed previously, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin created a right
of contribution among joint tortfeasors based on the relative degrees
of fault of each defendant.
The Supreme Court of Florida addressed this issue in
Lincenberg v. Issen.72 Although the defendant Lincenberg was ac-
tually contending that the Hoffman principles equating liability
with fault implied that each party could only be held liable for his
proportionate share of the damages (i.e., that the doctrine of joint
and several liability should be limited or abrogated), the court in-
stead focused on the collateral issue of contribution. 73
In the early part of its opinion, the Lincenberg court indicated
that the Hoffman "rationale eliminates justification for the no con-
tribution principle and dictates that [the] rule be abolished." The
court further stated that "there is no equitable justification for rec-
ognizing the right of the plaintiff to seek recovery on the basis of
apportionment of fault while denying the right of fault allocation as
between negligent defendants."7
The court itself never actually reached a decision as to whether
contribution should be based on relative degrees of fault,7" since the
legislature had just passed the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act." The new statute provides for a pro rata right to contri-
bution only,7" and was made applicable to all cases pending on the
date of its becoming law.79
Therefore, the court was faced with the choice of applying the
pro rata provision literally (resulting in substantial injustice to some
70. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
71. 16 Wisc. 2d 1, 114 N.W.2d 105 (1962). See note 52 supra and accompanying text.
72. 318 So. 2d 386 (Fla. 1975).
7:3. For a more detailed discussion of Lincenberg and the issue of joint and several
liability, see 30 U. MIAMI L. REv. 747 (1976). See also Timmons & Silvis, supra note 13, at
781.
74. 318 So. 2d at 391.
75. Id.
76. The court, in a footnote, mentioned several alternative apportionment methods* but
failed to implement them since the new statute provides a procedure for implementing contri-
bution. 318 So. 2d at 392.
77. FLA. STAT. § 768.31 (1975).
78. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(b) (1975).
79. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(7) (1975).
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defendants)" or finding some way to avoid the harsh effects of the
pro rata provision. Several courses of action were available. First,
the court could side-step the pro rata contribution problem by abro-
gating or limiting the doctrine of joint and several liability.8 ' Sec-
ond, the court could examine the constitutionality of the pro rata
provision of the statute." Third, the court might contend that
section (3)(a) of the Act (prohibiting consideration of relative de-
grees of fault in determining pro rata shares) is inconsistent with
section (3)(c) of the Act (providing that considerations of equity
generally shall apply), and therefore should be disregarded. 3
Justice Boyd's concurring opinion in Lincenberg proffered the
third alternative. He stated that because the two provisions con-
flicted, and because it is the court's duty to achieve legislative in-
tent and uphold the constitutionality of statutes, the sections
should be read together as allowing consideration of relative degrees
of fault. 4
There are several problems with such a view despite the fact
that it seeks to reconcile the equity considerations of Hoffman with
the establishment of a right to contribution. First, the statutory
language is patently clear that relative degrees of fault are not to
be considered. 5 Second, both the legislative history" and the Com-
missioners' Comments to the 1955 draft of the Uniform Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasors Act 7 support the proposition that relative
degrees of fault are not to be considered in determining the pro rata
shares.
The lack of consistency in Florida's apportionment system is
readily apparent. Lincenberg states that the percentage of negli-
gence of the plaintiff must be compared to that of all the defendants
taken as a whole in determining the amount the plaintiff may re-
80. See examples in Part III supra.
81. This was actually defendant Lincenberg's contention, but a detailed examination of
this issue is beyond the scope of this article. For a discussion of the subject see 30 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 747 (1976).
82. The Lincenberg court specifically declined to rule on the constitutionality of the
statute. 318 So. 2d at 391 n.*. See Part VI infra for a discussion of the constitutionality of
§ 768.31 (1975).
83. See note 9 supra for the full text of section 3.
84. 318 So. 2d at 394.
85. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975).
86. See note 57 supra.
87. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 2, Commissioners' Comments
(1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 87 (1975).
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cover." Furthermore, the court stated that because of the "pro rata"
provision of the new Act, juries should not allocate a percentage
of fault attributable to each defendant, and that special interro-
gatories should be limited to those situations where section (3)(c)
general equity considerations are applicable.89 According to the
Commissioners' Comments those equity considerations will rarely
occur;"' therefore, in essence, special interrogatories would rarely be
permissible. An apportionment system which attempts to equate
liability with fault necessarily must allocate to each party his share
of the negligence. Unless joint and several liability is abrogated,
allowing special interrogatories would be an advisable method of
allocating the burden of each party.' Objections to special interro-
gatories on the grounds that they are too complicated for widespread
use are not justified since the jury in Lincenberg seemed to have no
difficulty in allocating a percentage of fault to each party.
V. ADDITIONAL PROBLEMS: SETTLEMENT AND RELEASE PROVISIONS OF
THE CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT
Although not discussed in Lincenberg, the settlement" and re-
lease 3 provisions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act raise
other unfavorable aspects regarding the operation of contribution in
Florida. 4 Contrary to the spirit of Hoffman v. Jones95 and perhaps
88. See 318 So. 2d at 393-94.
89. Id.
90. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORs Acr § 2, Commissioners' Comment
(1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANNS. 87 (1975). See also note 12 supra.
91. See 30 U. MIAMI L. REV. 747, 753 (1976).
92. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(d) (1975).
93. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1975).
94. The release provisions of the Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act are similar to those
found in FLA. STAT. § 768.041 (1975). Prior to the passage of FLA. STAT. § 768.041 (1975), early
Florida decisions held that a release or discharge of one or more joint tortfeasors, executed in
satisfaction of the tort, was a discharge of all joint tortfeasors since the party injured could
have but one satisfaction for damages sustained. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Boone, 85 So.
2d 834 (Fla. 1956); Davidow v. Seyfarth, 58 So. 2d 865 (Fla. 1952); Feinstone v. Allison
Hosp., Inc., 106 Fla. 302, 143 So. 251 (1932); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, 67 Fla. 257, 65 So.
8 (1914). Each tortfeasor was considered to sanction all the acts of the others and each was
liable for the whole damage caused, as if it had been occasioned solely by himself. Id. Thus,
any person who paid the victim for the injury paid for all. Id. No further action against any
other tortfeasor was possible as nothing remained for which the other tortfeasor could be
liable. Id.
The fact that a release contained a provision stipulating that the instrument released
no one except the covenantee from liability did not relieve the instrument from the general
rule discharging joint liability. Roper v. Florida Pub. Util. Co., 131 Fla. 709, 179 So. 904
(1938); Louisville & N.R.R. v. Allen, supra. The Florida courts, however, soon recognized a
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the Act itself in establishing the right to contribution, these provi-
sions allow a defendant to pay only a small portion of the total
damages and relieve himself from further liability, while the non-
settling defendant remains responsible for the entire balance of the
judgment with no right of contribution against the settling tortfea-
sor.
96
The problem may be illustrated as follows: A and B are liable
to P for $100,000. If P were to settle with A for $10,000 and release
him, B would then be liable for the remaining $90,000, and would
not have a right of contribution from A. Because B has no right of
contribution from A,"7 the result is clearly contrary to apportion-
ment principles based on equating liability with fault. Had A re-
distinction between a release and a covenant not to sue and began to attach different proce-
dural consequences to each. See, e.g., Albert's Shoes, Inc. v. Crabtree Constr. Co., 89 So. 2d
491 (Fla. 1956); Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Boone, supra; Davidow v. Seyfarth, supra; Martin
v. Burney, 34 So. 2d 36 (Fla. 1948); City of Miami v. Miner, 124 Fla. 684, 169 So. 609 (1936).
The legal difference between the two was highly technical and focused on the intent of
the parties in drawing the instrument. A release was defined as an outright cancellation or
discharge of the entire obligation as to one or all of the alleged joint wrongdoers. Albert's
Shoes, Inc. v. Crabtree Constr. Co., supra at 492. Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Boone, supra
at 843. A covenant not to sue recognizes that the obligation or liability continues, but the
injured party agrees not to assert any rights grounded thereon against a particular covenan-
tor. Id. Thus, if it was apparent on the face of the instrument that the intention was to
discharge the liability of one joint tortfeasor, the court would hold that the indivisible joint
liability as to the other tortfeasor was also extinguished. If, on the other hand, it was clear
that the consideration paid was not intended as full compensation for the injuries, and that
the agreement intended to preserve the liability of those who were not parties to it, the
provision was construed as a covenant not to sue instead of a technical release.
The passage of FLA. STAT. § 58.28 (1957), as amended, FLA. STAT. § 768.041 (1975),
provided a statutory exception to previous case law and gave rise to the terms "pro tanto
release" and "release in bar." See Walker v. U-Haul Co., 300 So. 2d 289 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1974),
cert. denied, 314 So. 2d 588 (Fla. 1975); Talcott v. Central Bank & Trust Co., 247 So. 2d 727
(Fla. 3d Dist. 1971), cert. denied, 262 So. 2d (Fla. 1972); Ellingson v. Willis, 170 So. 2d 311
(Fla. 1st Dist. 1964); Mathis v. Virgin, 167 So. 2d 897 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1964); cert. denied, 174
So. 2d 30 (Fla. 1965). The statute declared that where there existed multiple tortfeasors in
connection with injuries or damages accruing to a party, recovery from one joint tortfeasor
was to be set off against any recovery against another joint tortfeasor. FLA. STAT. § 768.041(2)
(1975). Where the parties did not intend a full satisfaction of a judgment against more than
one tortfeasor, a partial satisfaction or release as to one tortfeasor was effective only as a pro
tanto release of the judgment and did not constitute a release of the judgment and did not
constitute a release in bar. Mathis v. Virgin, supra.
Because they almost duplicate FLA. STAT. § 768.041, the release provisions of the Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act will not significantly change prior Florida law, as FLA. STAT.
§ 768.31(5)(a) specifies that a release or covenant to sue will not discharge any other tortfea-
sors from liability unless its terms so provide.
95. 280 So. 2d 431 (1973).
96. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5)(b) (1975).
97. Id.
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mained in the lawsuit, B's pro rata share would only be $50,000, i.e.,
50 percent of the damages. B's reluctance to settle has cost him an
additional $40,000. The injustice of the situation is further mangni-
fled if we assume that B was only 5 percent at fault as compared to
A's 95 percent. The person most responsible for the damages, A,
pays only 10 percent of the total damages, while B, who is only 5
percent at fault pays 90 percent of the total damages, an excess of
40 percent over his pro rata share and 85 percent over his propor-
tioned share. This result is obtained, however, only if Florida Stat-
utes section 768.31(5)(a), which provides that any release or cove-
nant not to sue granted one tortfeasor reduces the claim of the
plaintiff against the other defendants to the extent of any amount
stipulated by release,' is interpreted to mean that the reduction in
the amount given for the release refers only to the dollar amount
received by the plaintiff and does not mean a reduction in the
amount of damages equivalent to A's pro rata share. 8
Furthermore, while the Act contains a provision requiring that
the release or covenant be given in good faith,9" a danger exists that
the settlement or release granted by the plaintiff could be collusive,
yet still enforceabl as against the non-settling joint tortfeasor. A
legally sophisticate, but unscrupulous tortfeasor, aware of the ex-
tent of his possible liability, could approach the plaintiff with what
seems to be a favorable settlement, leaving the ignorant but stub-
born tortfeasor exposed to liability beyond his pro rata share and
perhaps even further beyond his true proportionate share. More-
over, the plaintiff is free to select the tortfeasor with which he
settles on the basis of criteria not related to equitably distributing
the loss. If one of the purposes of establishing contribution is to
alleviate the inequities caused by affording the plaintiff-victim the
absolute power to determine whom to sue and from whom to col-
lect,'"I the present legislation falls far short of achieving such a goal.
98. Such an interpretation, however, appears to be the correct one in light of modifica-
tions made in the 1955 Uniform Act because of objections to the release provisions of the 1939
version. The 1939 Act provided in section 5 that a release of any tortfeasor should not release
him from liability for contribution unless it expressly provided for a reduction to the extent
of the pro rata share of the released tortfeasor of the injured person's recoverable damages.
12 UNIFORtM LAWS ANN. 58 (1975). The absence of any such language in the 1955 Act, upon
which Florida's contribution law is based, would indicate that the amount stipulated by the
release no longer has to be equivalent to the pro rata share of the settling tortfeasor.
99. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1975).
100. See generally notes 20-21 supra and accompanying text.
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Instead of eliminating the prior arbitrariness possessed by the vic-
tim in determining the party from whom he sues or collects, the new
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act merely provides his capri-
ciousness with new legislative clothing. The ultimate effect of the
Act may be to encourage settlement at the expense of full and equi-
table litigation of the issue of culpability. But in light of the princi-
ples of Hoffman v. Jones,'°' it is difficult to concur with the Commis-
sioners' Comments that it is more important to settle than to at-
tempt to prevent discrimination by the plaintiff among potential
defendants. '0"
VI. CONSTITUTIONAL VALIDITY
Despite the inequities inherent in Section 768.31 and its incon-
sistency with the Hoffman v. Jones'"' philosophy of equating
liability with fault, the statute appears capable of withstanding
constitutional attack. This analysis will be confined to substantive
due process and equal protection issues as related to the pro rata
sharing,' 4 settlement,' 5 and release'"' provisions which appear to be
the strongest bases for attacking the statute's validity.
With regard to the Florida Constitution, 17 the test to be used
in determining whether a statute is violative of the due process
clause is whether it bears a reasonable relation to a permissible
legislative objective and is not discriminatory, arbitrary, or oppres-
sive. 08 Thus, under this test, it is necessary to first examine the
legislative objectives in enacting the statute in order to determine
whether the pro rata, settlement, and release provisions are reasona-
bly related to them. For this purpose it is unnecessary to evaluate
the wisdom of the means selected by the legislature or even whether
101. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
102. See 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99-100 (1975).
103. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
104. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975).
105. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(d) (1975).
106. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1975).
107. FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 9.
108. Lasky, v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974). In light of the apparent
demise of fourteenth amendment substantive due process in Ferguson v. Skrupa, 372 U.S.
726 (1963), only the state constitutional due process issues will be discussed. Moreover, it is
easier to invalidate a statute under Florida due process concepts than under federal due
process. For a discussion of the relation between Florida and federal due process see Com-
ment, Substantive Due Process in Florida, 21 U. MIAMI L. REV. 99, 100 (1966).
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the selected means will in fact accomplish the intended goals; only
the constitutionality of the selected means is of relevance."'
Section 768.31 is of little aid in this regard since it merely states
the effect of the contribution law without explicating its underlying
purposes. From an examination of the statute itself and the Com-
missioners' Comments to the 1955 Revision of the Uniform Contri-
bution Among Tortfeasors Act, together with the opinions of other
courts in jurisdictions where the same or similar statutes have been
adopted, it appears that the legislative objectives included the crea-
tion of a right of contribution among joint tortfeasors and the estab-
lishment of a procedure to make such a right of contribution effec-
tive in practice."10 It was intended by the act that equity should
prevail over the harsh injustice of the common law rule under which
there was no such right."' With regard to pro rata shares, the Com-
missioners' Comment to the 1955 draft of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act provides in pertinent part:
This section in positive terms resolves several difficult questions
of policy.
First, it recognizes and registers the lack of need for a com-
parative negligence or degree of fault rule in contribution cases.
As stated in the comments on subsection 1(c)"'2 the exclusion of
intentional, wilful and wanton actors from the right to contribu-
tion eliminates the better arguments for a relative degree of fault
rule."'3
With respect to the release or covenant not to sue provision, the
Commissioners' Comment explains:
Subsection (b). Effect on Contribution. The 1939 Act' 4 provided,
in Section 5, that a release of any tortfeasor should not release
him from liability for contribution unless it expressly provided for
a reduction "to the extent of the pro rata share of the released
tortfeasor" of the injured person's recoverable damages ...
109. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
110. See generally 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 59-69 (1975).
111. See UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT, Commissioners' Prefatory
Note (1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 59-60 (1975).
112. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(c) (1975).
113. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS ACT § 2, Commissioners' Comments
(1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 87 (1975) (footnotes added for clarification).
114. For a reprint of the 1939 Act see 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 57-59 (1975).
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The effect of Section 5 of the 1939 Act has been to discourage
settlements in joint tort cases, by making it impossible for one
tortfeasor alone to take a release and close the file ...
It seems more important not to discourage settlements than
to make an attempt of doubtful effectiveness to prevent discrimi-
nation by plaintiffs, or collusion in the suit. Accordingly, the
subsection provides that the release in good faith discharges the
tortfeasor outright from all liability for contribution. This is con-
sistent with Section 1(d)"15 above, which provides that the set-
tling tortfeasor has himself no right of contribution against an-
other unless he has assumed the full responsibility to the claim-
ant."11
The objectives of Section 768.31 could represent a valid exercise
of the state police power in that they are somewhat related to the
protection of the public safety, health, general welfare or morals."'
In order to determine whether the statute is reasonably related to
such permissible legislative objectives, it is necessary to examine
the changes that the statute makes in prior tort law.
Before the enactment of Section 768.31 there was no common
law right of contribution in Florida." ' Thus, the statute appears
reasonably related to the legislative objectives since it in fact creates
this right. Admittedly, situations may exist where the statute's pro
rata and settlement provisions work inequities since a tortfeasor's
final liability may be greater than his, relative degree of fault. Even
so, as the Supreme Court of Florida , after noting in Lasky v. State
Farm Insurance Co."9 that under the threshold limitations for the
recovery of damages in the no-fault law situations could be per-
ceived in which severe pain might be uncompensated while in other
situations suit could still be brought for extremely minor intangible
damages, stated:
[Plerfection is not required in classification; "problems of gov-
ernment are practical ones and may justify, if they do not require,
rough accommodations, -illogical, it may be, and unscientific."
Metropolis Theatre Co. v. Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 33 S. Ct. 441, 57
115. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(d) (1975).
116. UNIFORM CONTRIBUTION AMONG TORTFEASORS AcT § 4, Commissioners' Comments
(1955 Revision), 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99-100 (1975) (footnotes added for clarification).
117. See Pacheo v. Pacheo, 246 So. 2d 778 (Fla. 1971). See also Comment, supra note
108.
118. See note 14 supra.
119. 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974).
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L.Ed. 730 (1913). Some inequality in result is not enough to vi-
tiate on due process grounds a legislative classification grounded
in reason. Lindsley v. National Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61,
31 S. Ct. 337, 55 L. Ed. 369 (1911).'-
Finally, with respect to due process issues and contribution, it
is very questionable whether there could be any deprivation of life,
liberty, or property in the constitutional sense. There is no constitu-
tional right to contribution. Contribution is a right based on equita-
ble principles. 2' To argue that the statute which creates a particular
right simultaneously takes it away would seem to be circuitous and
specious reasoning.'22 Moreover, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
stated in Pennsylvania Greyhound Lines v. Rosenthal"3 that where
common liability was previously enforceable against one or more
tortfeasors at the election of the injured person, without the benefit
of contribution, the contribution statute did not increase the liabil-
ity of any of the tortfeasors, but rather lessened it by providing for
a distribution of the common burden in lieu of the arbitrary choice
given to the injured person. The New Jersey court held that, under
these circumstances, there is no vested right to protection against
contribution.
With regard to possible equal protection issues, the Florida
Constitution'24 requires that statutory classifications be reasonable
and non-arbitrary, and that all persons in the same class be treated
alike. When the difference in treatment between those included and
those excluded from a class bears a real and substantial relationship
to legislative purpose, the classification does not deny equal protec-
tion. 5
The traditional equal protection test under the United States
Constitution, being somewhat of a more relaxed test than that of
Florida,'27 will not invalidate a statute unless it is found to be with-
120. Id. at 17.
121. Lincenberg v. Issen, 318 So. 2d 386, 390 (Fla. 1975).
122. Moreover, the fact that there was no right of contribution prior to the statute would
appear to preclude any arguments that it denies the right of access to courts in violation of
FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 21, and is therefore distinguishable from Kluger v. White, 281 So. 2d 1
(Fla. 1973).
123. 14 N.J. 372, 102 A.2d 587 (1954).
124. FLA. CONST. Art. I, § 2.
125. Lasky v. State Farm Ins. Co., 296 So. 2d 9 (Fla. 1974); Daniels v. O'Connor, 243
So. 2d 144 (Fla. 1971).
126. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
127. Unlike the federal courts, the Supreme Court of Florida does not always adhere to
[Vol. 30:713
COMPARATIVE CONTRIBUTION
out any reasonable basis, and therefore patently arbitrary.'," Since
the state test is stricter than its federal counterpart, it will be used
here exclusively to analyze the contribution statute.' 9
Initially, it is important to note that with respect to the stat-
ute's pro rata provision, all joint tortfeasors are treated alike, thus
meeting the first element of the test.'30 Moreover, the differentiation
with respect to those joint tortfeasors who enter settlement agree-
ments with the injured parties does not appear to be arbitrary.
Rather, such a differentiation appears to bear a real and substantial
relation to the legislative purpose of encouraging out of court settle-
ments.
The only way that a joint tortfeasor might contend that the
statute deprived him of equal protection would be to argue that
under the principles of Hoffman v. Jones'3 ' the word equal means
the equation of liability with fault. Under this rationale a joint
tortfeasor who had to pay a greater percentage of the damages than
his degree or percentage of fault would be denied equal protection.
But in Lasky the Supreme Court of Florida rejected such reasoning
while addressing itself to the permanent injury threshold for seeking
damages for pain and suffering under the Florida no-fault law. The
court noted that legislative classification under the no-fault law
might result in allowing recovery for pain and suffering in some
cases where the suffering is relatively minimal while possibly pro-
hibiting recovery for such items in a few cases where a significant
amount of suffering is in fact present. "But perfection in classifica-
the presumption of legislative validity. See Alloway, Florida Constitutional Law, 14 U. MIAMI
L. REV. 501, 512 (1960).
128. Lindley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61 (1911). The traditional test is
generally applied to economic and social legislation. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471,
485 (1970). Under federal equal protection, state legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that the laws may actually result in some
inequality. A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if any reasonably conceived state
of facts justify it. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
Since the contribution statute involves no fundamental right or suspect criteria, the
stricter federal equal protection test would not be applicable to the present analysis. See
generally, Note, Developments in the Law-Equal Protection, 82 HARV. L. REV. 1065 (1969).
129. Logically, if the statute is found to be valid under the stricter Florida test, it should
also be valid under the federal test. However, the converse would not necessarily be true.
130. The fact that all joint tortfeasors are subject to the statute distinguishes it from
Florida's old railraod comparative negligence statute, which Georgia S. & Fla. Ry. v. Seven-
up Bottling Co., 175 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 1965), held to be in violation of equal protection. It
applied to railraod accident cases but not automobile accident cases.
131. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
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tion is not required and rough and unscientific accommodations are
permissible so long as they are not unreasonable or arbitrary."''
Under this test, the court found the permanent injury threshold to
not be violative of equal protection.
An analogous argument would seem to hold true with respect
to the contribution statute. Even though there may be situations
where a tortfeasor must pay a greater percentage of damages than
his percentage of fault, the statute is not clearly arbitrary or unrea-
sonable in a constitutional sense since rough accommodations are
permissible. Therefore, despite the statute's inequitable features
and apparent inconsistency with the principles espoused in
Hoffman, section 768.31 should withstand constitutional attack.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the final analysis, then, legislative changes in the Contribu-
tion Among Tortfeasor Act are necessary.'33 The pro rata section'34
should be replaced with a provision requiring that relative degrees
of fault be considered in determining the amount of contribution
one tortfeasor can seek from another. The settlement' 35 and release 3"
provisions may warrant legislative changes as well. When one defen-
dant tortfeasor settles with or is given a release by the plaintiff, that
plaintiff should be prohibited from collecting from the second defen-
dant tortfeasor any excess over that tortfeasor's proportionate share
of the damages. For example, if P's (not negligent) damages are
$100,000 and he settles for $20,000 with A, who is later adjudged 60
percent negligent, P should only recover $40,000 from B (40 percent
of $100,000). Even though such a statute might serve as a disincen-
tive to settle out of court, it is submitted that achieving consistency
in apportionment of liability based on each party's relative degree
of fault is of primary importance. This is especially true since the
chances of discrimination by the plaintiff or collusion between an-
other defendant and the plaintiff are very real dangers.
The Commissions' Comments to the 1955 draft of the Uniform
132. 296 So. 2d at 20.
133. A constitutional challenge to the statute will likely fail. See Part VI supra. Further-
more, the court seems unwilling to discuss limiting joint and several liability as an alterna-
tive. See 30 U. MiAmi L. REV. 747 (1976).
134. Fta. STAT. § 768.31(3) (1975).
135. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(2)(d) (1975).
136. FLA. STAT. § 768.31(5) (1975).
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Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act, however, indicate their belief
that such a provision would not stop collusion or discrimination, but
only serve as to prevent parties from settling out of court.'37
While it is true some plaintiffs may be discouraged from set-
tling, it is not true that defendants would be. If contribution were
not allowed against the settling party, and the non-settling party
were held responsible only for his proportionate share, neither would
be handicapped. In a situation where the settling defendant settled
for an amount which later turned out to be in excess of his propor-
tionate share, he should be prohibited from seeking contribu-
tion-he merely made a bad bargain. Prompt legislative attention
to these problems is needed.t
137. 12 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 99-100 (1975).
t During the Final stages of the publishing process of this issue, the Florida Legislature
amended Florida statutes § 768.31(3)(a) to provide:
(3) PRO RATA SHARES - In determining the pro rata shares of tortfeasors
in the entire liability:
(a) Their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis for allocation of liability.
Fla. Laws 1976, ch. 76-186 amending FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (1975). This amendment is
effective June 21, 1976.
The legislative change is commendable in that it is consistent with the Hoffman court's
desire to equate liability with fault. However, there may still be situations where appor-
tionment will not be based on fault. Cases where one defendant settles with or is released by
the plaintiff would present such a situation. Therefore, the legislature may want to re-
examine the statutory treatment of contribution in such instances if liability is to be fully
equated with fault.
19761
